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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for drug violence
26 results foundAuthor: Moraes de Castro, Anderson Title: Drug Control and Its Consequences in Rio de Janeiro Summary: Although Rio de Janeiro (Rio) has not been the capital of Brazil since the 1960s, it is a beautiful city known internationally for its fireworks show on New Year's Eve on Copacabana beach and its carnival parades in the Sambadrome. The local violence associated with police repression and illicit drugs - known as Rio's urban war - is also known well beyond Brazil's national borders. This article presents the challenges of responding to the illicit drug market and its associated violence in Rio, highlighting the characteristics and dynamics of the markets, the impacts of the current drug policy approach adopted by the State of Rio on the scale of the illicit market, and its implications for the human rights and security of affected populations, in particular for the slum dwellers. Details: London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2010. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: IDPC Briefing Paper: Accessed December 1, 2010 at: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/IDPC%20Briefing%20Paper%20Violence%20in%20Rio.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/IDPC%20Briefing%20Paper%20Violence%20in%20Rio.pdf Shelf Number: 120332 Keywords: Drug MarketsDrug PolicyDrug ViolenceDrugs (Rio de Janeiro)Violent Crime |
Author: Grayson, George W. Title: Threat Posed by Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico Summary: Until the 1980s, Mexico enjoyed relative freedom from violence. Ruthless drug cartels existed, but they usually abided by informal rules of conduct hammered out between several capos and representatives of the dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which ruled the country until the 1990s. Relying on bribes, the desperados pursued their illicit activities with the connivance of authorities. In return for the legal authorities turning a blind eye, drug dealers behaved discretely, shunned high-tech weapons, deferred to public figures, spurned kidnapping, and even appeared with governors at their children’s weddings. Unlike their Colombian counterparts, Mexico’s barons did not seek elective office. In addition, they did not sell drugs within the country, corrupt children, target innocent people, engage in kidnapping, or invade the turf or product-line (marijuana, heroin, cocaine, etc.) of competitors. The situation was sufficiently fluid so that should a local police or military unit refuse to cooperate with a cartel, the latter would simply transfer its operations to a nearby municipality where they could clinch the desired arrangement. Three key events in the 1980s and 1990s changed the “live and let live” ethos that enveloped illegal activities. Mexico became the new avenue for Andean cocaine shipped to the United States after the U.S. military and law-enforcement authorities sharply reduced its flow into Florida and other South Atlantic states. The North American Free Trade Agreement, which took effect on January 1, 1994, greatly increased economic activities throughout the continent. Dealers often hid cocaine and other drugs among the merchandise that moved northward through Nuevo Laredo, El Paso, Tijuana, and other portals. The change in routes gave rise to Croesus-like profits for cocaine traffickers--a phenomenon that coincided with an upsurge of electoral victories. Largely unexamined amid this narco-mayhem are vigilante activities. With federal resources aimed at drug traffickers and local police more often a part of the problem than a part of the solution, vigilantes are stepping into the void. Suspected criminals who run afoul of these vigilantes endure the brunt of a skewed version of justice that enjoys a groundswell of support. Details: Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2011 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1082 Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1082 Shelf Number: 122800 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug ViolenceVigilantismViolent Crime |
Author: Hale, Gary J. Title: A "Failed State" in Mexico: Tamaulipas Declares Itself Ungovernable Summary: Mexico finds itself in a precarious position, given the level of victimization that the drug cartel wars are imposing on its citizens and the resultant loss of civil authority that is increasingly being eroded by pressures placed on local and state governments by drug trafficking organizations. The larger part of the violence is occurring in two regions in Mexico - namely, the Pacific states, where drugs and chemicals are introduced into the country; and the northern border, where those same illegal commodities are ultimately exported into the United States. Criminality is visibly gaining ground over local governments, gradually subverting the abilities of mayors and governors to function effectively. Drug cartels are controlling police assets from behind the barrel of a gun or with more money than public coffers can afford, thereby negating the ability of elected officials to direct security resources from the chambers of city halls and state government houses. The cartels make and enforce their own rules, often with little to no interference from legitimate municipal authorities. Mexican officials continue being threatened, kidnapped, tortured, and killed, most often with impunity, and common folk are in fear, unable to freely carry on the tasks of daily living because of the war that endlessly rages around them. The implications of an admitted loss of governmental control in the Mexico border area stretching from Nueva Ciudad Guerrero in the northwest to Matamoros in the southeast, and beyond to Monterrey and Ciudad Juarez is troubling not only because the cartels are victimizing anyone who crosses their path, or that drug smuggling is occurring despite warring among the cartels and between the cartels and the government, but because the adjacent states of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, and Chihuahua could readily suffer the same loss of control if the strength and influence of the cartels are not reversed and subsequently eliminated. Details: Houston, TX: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, 2011. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 31, 2012 at http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/DRUG-pub-HaleTamaulipasFailedState-072611.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/DRUG-pub-HaleTamaulipasFailedState-072611.pdf Shelf Number: 123911 Keywords: Drug Cartels (Mexico)Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug ViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto Title: Living in Fear: Social Penetration of Criminal Organizations in Mexico Summary: Citizens in Mexico are trapped in between two illegitimate forces { the criminal organizations and the police who are supposed to protect them. Through the use of list experiments within the Survey on Public Safety and Governance in Mexico (SPSGM), we measure the pervasiveness of drug gang activity as it pertains to strategies of coercion (extortion) and co- optation (offering help) to ordinary citizens. The paper seeks to provide a better understanding of which groups are most vulnerable and where is it that drug gangs have become most embedded in society. Our findings suggest that although narcotra cantes extort citizens the most in high violence regions and the police does so in low violence ones, both forms of extortion are present everywhere in Mexico. This has triggered a spiral of fear: drug gangs signal unambiguously that they are in control, they overtly operate in many of Mexico's localities, while the police can't credibly signal that they can regain control of the streets. Police corruption is hence an essen- tial part of the story of Mexico's violence. Ever more fearful citizens have turned to the narcos for help, we demonstrate, and hence many tacitly {or even openly{ support them. Public strategies emphasizing military action and harsh treatment might not affect the social embeddedness that protects drug gangs and criminal organizations, even though it is a necessary action in the short-run. Instead, enhancing citizen trust within communities by effectively cleaning the police forces while improving the adjudication of justice are more likely to strengthen the social fabric. Details: San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 3, 2012 at: http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/502967.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/502967.pdf Shelf Number: 124810 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug ViolenceGangsOrganized Crime (Mexico)Police Corruption |
Author: Murray, Chad Title: Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations and Marijuana: The Potential Effects of U.S. Legalization Summary: Mexico's drug war has claimed more than 30,000 lives since 2006. The intensity and duration of this violence has produced an environment in which “few Mexican citizens feel safer today than they did ten years ago, and most believe that their government is losing the fight.” However, the problem of drug violence in Mexico is not domestic, but transnational in nature. President Barack Obama recently noted that “we are very mindful that the battle President Calderón is fighting inside of Mexico is not just his battle; it's also ours. We have to take responsibility just as he is taking responsibility.” It is U.S. demand for illicit drugs that provides the primary incentive for Mexican narcotics trafficking. Therefore, there is a possibility that a change in U.S. drug policy could negatively affect the revenues of Mexican DTOs, and even their ability to wage violence. This paper will examine the validity of that argument, as well as several of the issues that would accompany such a fundamental policy shift. The purpose of this report is to evaluate current U.S. policy on marijuana, extract lessons learned from policy changes in other countries, analyze the effects that legalization of marijuana in the United States might have on Mexican DTOs, and provide recommendations for future U.S. policies. Current U.S. laws will serve as a starting point to determine if existing decriminalization or medicinal marijuana reforms have had any impact on Mexican DTOs. After examining what effects, if any, these policies have had, reforms in other countries will be examined. From the case studies of Portugal, the Netherlands, and Mexico, lessons will be drawn to give context to any possible ramifications or benefits of U.S. marijuana legalization. Finally, concrete recommendations will be made on whether recent marijuana policy reforms should be maintained, improved, or repealed. Details: Washington, DC: George Washington University, The Elliott School of International Affairs, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Elliott School of International Affairs/Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission: Capstone Report: Accessed April 30, 2012 at: http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/acad/lahs/mexico-marijuana-071111.pdf Shelf Number: 125103 Keywords: DecriminalizationDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug PolicyDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug Violence |
Author: Gibbons, Cara Title: Corruption, Impunity, Silence: The WAR on Mexico’s Journalists Summary: Sixty-six Mexican journalists have been killed since 20001, at least 34 since President Calderón launched a “war on drugs” after taking office at the end of 2006. During that time, the government’s highly militarized campaigns, particularly in the northern border states, have created staggering levels of violence and an atmosphere in which working journalists face constant threats and vicious, often lethal, attacks. Few of these crimes are investigated properly, much less prosecuted, despite successive administrations’ promises to end the country’s shameful record of impunity. Instead, the government has beguiled international observers and its own citizens with meretricious reforms that do little to halt a grave and worsening human rights crisis. In these extraordinary circumstances, Mexico’s journalists have also contended with laws that limit freedom of expression and muzzle their attempts to expose corruption at both local and state levels. Consequently, accurate reporting on the drug war has become all but impossible. Yet, faced with this crisis, the Mexican government has dithered over reforms that could protect reporters, while prosecuting citizen journalists who run afoul of the country’s labyrinthine communications legislation. This report examines why Mexico has failed to confront the sources of its internal corruption. It also looks at the state’s failure to defend Mexico’s journalists from the extreme violence they face at the hands of drug trafficking organizations and corrupt state agents who carry out the most brazen assaults on free and open communication with almost complete impunity. It finds that Mexico is breaching its binding international human rights obligations, including the right to life and the right to freedom of expression. Details: Toronto: PEN Canada; Toronto: International Himan Rights Program, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 2011. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2012 at: http://www.utorontoihrp.com/index.php/resources/working-group-reports/cat_view/10-working-group-and-clinic-reports/28-corruption-impunity-silence-the-war-on-mexicos-journalists Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.utorontoihrp.com/index.php/resources/working-group-reports/cat_view/10-working-group-and-clinic-reports/28-corruption-impunity-silence-the-war-on-mexicos-journalists Shelf Number: 125341 Keywords: CorruptionDrug ViolenceHomicidesHuman RightsJournalists (Mexico)Media |
Author: Rodriguez Cuevas, Jose A. Title: The Balloon Effect and Mexican Homeland Security: What it Means to be the Weakest Link in the Americas’ Security Chain Summary: The sudden increase in crime and violence in some Mexican cities and regions has raised security concerns not only in Mexico, where President Felipe Calderon categorized these crimes as a threat to Mexican society, but also in the United States, where Department of Homeland Secretary head Janet Napolitano referred to stemming the violence as “vital to core U.S. national interests.” Mexico is concerned with the latent threat of violence spreading all over the nation, while the U.S. is trying to guard against spillover. Both governments are concerned by the increased violence and its impact on communities along the U.S.–Mexican border. Because of its geopolitical location along the southern U.S. border, Mexico is susceptible to possible undesired effects of U.S. strategies. These unintended, second-degree consequences are known as “balloon effects,” after the airflow inside a balloon when constriction applied to one area sends pressure to another area in the balloon, thinning and weakening its wall. Since 2006, Mexico’s strategy for countering transnational organized crime and related activities has sent the balloon effect in two directions: first, inside Mexico, where government actions have unbalanced the criminal structure, creating balloon effects inside Mexican territory; and second, within the U.S. while asking to escalate the Mexican effort to improve its anti-crime strategy with U.S. assistance has escalated conflict and led to a holistic strategy against transnational organized crime and related activities in the Americas. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 85p. Source: Internet Resoruce: Thesis: Accessed July 3, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Shelf Number: 125464 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceHomeland SecurityOrganized Crime (Mexico) |
Author: Pew Research Center. Global Attitudes Project Title: Mexicans Back Military Campaign Against Cartels: Despite Doubts About Success, Human Rights Costs Summary: As Felipe Calderón’s term as Mexico’s president draws to a close, Mexicans continue to strongly back his policy of deploying the military to combat the country’s powerful drug cartels. Eight-in-ten say this is the right course, a level of support that has remained remarkably constant since the Pew Global Attitudes Project first asked the question in 2009. Support for Calderón’s strategy continues despite limited confidence that the government is winning the drug war, and widespread concerns about its costs. Just 47% believe progress is being made against drug traffickers, virtually identical to the 45% who held this opinion in 2011. Three-in-ten today say the government is actually losing ground against the cartels, while 19% see no change in the stand-off between the authorities and crime syndicates. At the same time, the public is uneasy about the moral cost of the drug war: 74% say human rights violations by the military and police are a very big problem. But concern about rights abuses coexist with continued worries about drug-related violence and crime – both of which strong majorities describe as pressing issues in Mexico. President Calderón himself remains popular. A 58%-majority has a favorable opinion of Mexico’s current leader. Although down from a high of 68% in 2009, this rating nonetheless puts him on par with the 56% who have a positive view of the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI’s) Enrique Peña Nieto, whose ratings clearly topped those of his opponents when the poll was conducted between March 20 and April 2 of this year. Whether Peña Nieto or any of the other presidential candidates have a solution to Mexico’s drug problems is an open question for the Mexican public. When asked which political party could do a better job of dealing with organized crime and drug traffickers, about equal numbers name Calderón’s National Action Party (PAN) (28%) and Peña Nieto’s PRI (25%), while only 13% point to the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Fully 23% volunteer that none of the parties is particularly capable of dealing with this critical issue. These are the principal findings from the latest survey in Mexico by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. Conducted face-to-face with 1,200 adults from across the country, the poll also finds that most Mexicans (61%) blame both the United States and their own country for the continued drug violence within their borders. While solid majorities would welcome U.S. assistance in combating the cartels if the aid came in the form of training, equipment or intelligence support, only a third would approve deploying U.S. troops on Mexican soil. Overall, a majority (56%) of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the United States, with about the same number (53%) convinced that Mexicans who migrate to the U.S. have a better life. Despite this perception, most Mexicans have no interest in migrating north across the border, although the percentage who say they would move to the U.S. if they had the means and opportunity has remained fairly steady since 2009. Details: Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2012. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2012 at: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Mexico-Report-FINAL-Wednesday-June-20-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Mexico-Report-FINAL-Wednesday-June-20-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 125627 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug War (Mexico)Organized Crime |
Author: Zedillo, Ernesto Title: Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism Summary: The papers contained in this book are based on presentations from the conference Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, organized by the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut on May 12 and 13, 2011. The motivation for the conference reflected in this volume stems from our belief that the existing framework for dealing with drug policies does not work. As part of our ongoing effort to support the creation and dissemination of ideas toward preserving international peace and security, we organized a forum at the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization in which we could take stock and distill the relevant research and empirical evidence generated over the years with regard to the present drug policies and make an effort to determine whether there is some potential for alternative policies. We elected to confront the research and existing policies with the state of affairs on this issue as seen through the prism of Mexico and the US. Details: New Haven, CT: Yale Center for the Study of Globalization at Yale University, 2012. 175p. Source: Internet Resource: A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook: Accessed July 20, 2012 at: http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/rethinking-war-on-drugs.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/rethinking-war-on-drugs.pdf Shelf Number: 125710 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeDrug EnforcementDrug PolicyDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceWar on Drugs (Mexico and U.S.) |
Author: Rios, Viridiana Title: Unexpected Consequences of Mexico’s Drug War for US National Security: More Mexican Immigrants Summary: Mexican immigration figures have reached its lowest point since 2000. Yet, even if as a whole the US is receiving less Mexican migrants, the opposite is true for cities at the border. In this paper, I present evidence to show that this sui generis migration pattern cannot be understood using traditional explanations of migration dynamics. Instead, Mexicans are migrating because of security issues, fearing drugrelated violence and extortion, which has spiked since 2008. I estimate that a total of 264,693 have migrated fearing organized crime activities. By doing so, I combine the literature of migration dynamics with the one of violence and crime, pointing towards ways in which non-state actors shape actions of state members. Details: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2012. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Paper presented at Violence, Drugs and Governance: Mexican Security in Comparative Perspective Conference, Stanford University. October 3-4, 2011 (Palo Alto, CA): Working Paper 2012-002, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Accessed August 6, 2012 at: http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Rios2012_SecurityIssuesAndImmigration3.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Rios2012_SecurityIssuesAndImmigration3.pdf Shelf Number: 125871 Keywords: Drug ViolenceIllegal AliensIllegal Immigration (Mexico, U.S.)ImmigrationWar on Drugs |
Author: Michaelsen, Maren M. Title: Mental Health and Labour Supply: Evidence from Mexico's Ongoing Violent Conflicts Summary: In Mexico, conflicts between drug-trafficking organisations result in a high number of deaths and immense suffering among both victims and non-victims every year. Little scientific research exists which identifies and quantifies the monetary and nonmonetary consequences of ongoing violent conflicts on individuals. Using the Mexican Family Life Survey for 2002 and 2005, the causal effect of mental health (symptoms of depression / anxiety) on the extensive and intensive margin of labour supply for work-ingaged men and women is estimated. Measures of the ongoing drug-related violent conflicts both at the macro level using intentional homicide rates by region, and at the micro level indicated by the presence of armed groups in the neighbourhood, serve as instruments for mental health. The results show a significant adverse impact of the conflicts on anxiety for men and women. Based on IV-Tobit model results, a worse mental health state decreases individual labour supply strongly and significantly for men. The findings demonstrate that Mexico's population not only suffers from the violent conflicts between drug-trafficking organisations by anxiety or even depression but also indirectly from less household income through less work which in turn has consequences for Mexico's social development and economic growth. Details: Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network, The Institute of Development Studies - at the University of Sussex, 2012. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 16, 2012 at: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-117.zip Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-117.zip Shelf Number: 126046 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Mexico)Drug ViolenceEconomic DevelopmentHomicidesLabor SupplyPoverty |
Author: Yap, Renee Title: Coca, Bolivia, and the War on Drugs: the Tension between Freedom from Fear and Freedom from Want Summary: This thesis aims to demonstrate the tension between human security’s core categories of freedom from fear and freedom from want. The two core categories of human security are often held to be complementary to each other. However, by applying a human security analysis to the War on Drugs in Bolivia, particularly with reference to the ideas of freedom from fear and freedom from want, it can be seen that the War on Drugs in Bolivia typifies a freedom from fear approach. This is illustrated through the War on Drugs focus on protecting individuals from physical violence and human rights abuses relating to situations of conflict, as well as its use of coercion strategies, such as sanctions or non-unilateral force; all of these of which are usual to a freedom from fear approach. An examination of how the War on Drugs has impacted upon the individuals of Bolivia reveals that despite the desired outcome of protecting individual safety and well-being, the War on Drugs has actually compromised the safety and well-being of Bolivians. In addition, in typifying freedom from fear, the War on Drugs in Bolivia has also challenged freedom from want by marginalising or threatening economic, community, food and health security, and thus defying claims that freedom from fear and freedom from want are complementary. This thesis concludes that by pursuing political and personal security, freedom from fear marginalises and even contests food, health, environmental and most especially economic and community security – the focal points of freedom from want. Security policies adopted to address transnational threats in developing countries must ensure that they not only account for the freedom from fear and freedom from want components of human security, but that they also account for, and manage, the potential for freedom from fear to undermine the wider goals of freedom from want. Details: Wellington, NZ: Victoria University of Wellington, 2010. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed October 24, 2012 at: http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10063/1424/thesis.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2010 Country: Bolivia URL: http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10063/1424/thesis.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 126784 Keywords: CocaineDrug Abuse and CrimeDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceWar on Drugs (Bolivia) |
Author: ASI Global, LLC Title: Kidnapping for Ransom in Mexico Summary: idnapping for ransom continues to be one of the most serious security risks throughout Mexico, making it one of the countries with the highest number of kidnappings in the world. The majority of kidnappings that take place in Mexico are attributed to small criminal groups that typically operate within a city or municipality rather than large organized groups whose areas of operation span across several cities or states. Some of these gangs are very sophisticated and choose their targets carefully, while others pick up victims of opportunity on the basis of a less selective process. Kidnapping for ransom was once mainly a concern for high-profile Mexican businessmen and their families. While they remain at high risk, organized crime groups now focus on a broader array of targets, including middle-class individuals and even simple merchants or traders. While these gangs operate independently for the most part, many have been linked to Mexican drug cartels. Details: Houston, TX: ASI Global, 2012. 6p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2012 at http://www.asiglobalresponse.com/downloads/Mexico_Analyst_Report_February_2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.asiglobalresponse.com/downloads/Mexico_Analyst_Report_February_2012.pdf Shelf Number: 127106 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug ViolenceKidnapping (Mexico)Ransom (Mexico)Violent Crime |
Author: Johnson, Lallen Title: Classifying Drug Markets by Travel Patterns: Testing Reuter and MacCoun's Typology of Market Violence Summary: Research to date has demonstrated significant relationships between the presence of outdoor drug markets and violent crime. Scholars have neglected however, to consider the role of travel distance on the drugs/violence nexus. The current study examines whether features of the distributions of travel distance to markets of drug buyers, drug sellers, or the interaction between the two distributions predicts drug market violence levels net of surrounding community demographic structure. Reuter and MacCoun's (1992) as yet untested model about the connections between drugs and violent crime, predicts that the interaction of drug seller and buyer distance distributions from varying distances more powerfully drug market violence levels than buyer and average distance averages. This suggests that how the travel patterns of the two major participants in drug markets intersect is key to understanding differences. That model is tested here. In addition, for comparison purposes, impacts of buyer and seller travel median distances are modeled separately. This work uses 5 years (2006-2010) of incident and arrest data from the Philadelphia Police Department. Reuter and MacCoun's model will be tested using the following analytical techniques. First, a methodology for locating and bounding drug markets using a nearest neighbor, hierarchical clustering technique is introduced. Using this methodology 34 drug markets are identified. Second, hierarchical linear models examining buyers and sellers separately predict travel distances to drug markets. Arrestees are nested within markets. This technique separates influences on distance arising from arrestees from drug market distance differences. Third, how market level median travel distance affects within drug market violence is considered. Specifically, the main effects of median buyer travel distance and median seller travel distance on drug market violence are captured using separate Poisson hierarchical linear models. Finally, impacts of the interaction between buyer and seller distance, Reuter and MacCoun's (1992) focus, are explored in another series of generalized hierarchical linear models. The main findings from the dissertation are as follows: 1. Results provide partial support for Reuter and MacCoun's drug market-violence model using multiple operationalizations. Public markets--those in which buyers and sellers travel from outside their own neighborhoods--are expected to be the most violent. 2. Separate raw distance measures for buyers and sellers correlate with within-drug market violence, after controlling for community demographics. 3. A negative effect of socioeconomic status and violence holds even when modeled with drug market variables. 4. As the proportion of crack cocaine sales within drug markets increases so too does within-market violence. Conceptual implications highlight the need to investigate social ties as an intervening variable in the travel distance »» drug market violence relationship. It is not clear from this research whether the travel distances of drug offenders in some way explains the amount or strength of social ties in a drug market, which in turn serves to suppress or elevate within-drug market violence. Policy implications suggest that Reuter and MacCoun's drug market types may connect with specific policing responses. Policing efforts may not receive much support from community residents because dense social networks may discourage reporting illicit activity. Markets drawing dealers and customers from farther away, and located around commercial and recreational centers may be amenable to place-based policing initiatives and coordinated intervention strategies with multiple city agencies. Details: Philadelphia: Temple University, 2012. 228p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed December 4, 2012 at: Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127124 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeDrug Markets (Philadelphia, U.S.)Drug ViolenceHierarchical Linear ModelingJourney to Crime |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: An Uneasy Coexistence: Security and Migration Along the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Border Summary: In September 2011, three WOLA staff members — Senior Associate Adam Isacson, Senior Fellow George Withers, and Program Assistant Joe Bateman — paid a five-day visit to El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Isacson returned to El Paso for three days in October. We found two cities that, while separated only by a narrow river, are rapidly growing further apart. Ciudad Juárez is undergoing wrenching change as dysfunctional state institutions confront powerful, hyper-violent criminal groups. El Paso has witnessed an unprecedented buildup of the U.S. government’s security and law enforcement apparatus. The results have been mixed. Violence has not spilled over into El Paso, in part because the drug traffickers do not want it to do so. The flow of migrants from Mexico into the El Paso region has nearly ground to a halt due to greatly increased U.S. security-force presence, the poor U.S. economy, and the danger that organized-crime groups pose for migrants on the Mexican side of the border. The flow of drugs, meanwhile, continues at or near the same level as always. What we saw in El Paso raised concerns about U.S. policy. Present levels of budgets and personnel may not be sustainable. Nor may they be desirable until a series of reforms are implemented. These include human rights training for law enforcement, improved intelligence coordination, reduced military involvement, stronger accountability mechanisms, increased anticorruption measures, and greater attention to ports of entry. They also include a much sharper distinction between violent threats like organized crime or terrorism, and non-violent social problems like unregulated migration. Any reforms, however, need to be guided by a coherent policy, and for the moment the U.S. government still lacks a comprehensive border security strategy. In El Paso, WOLA found that this lack of clarity amid a security buildup has hit the migrant population especially hard. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2013 at: http://www.wola.org/files/111219_uneasy_coexistence.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.wola.org/files/111219_uneasy_coexistence.pdf Shelf Number: 127636 Keywords: Border Law EnforcementBorder Security (U.S.)Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Southwest Border Security: Data Are Limited and Concerns Vary about Spillover Crime along the Southwest Border Summary: Drug-related homicides have dramatically increased in recent years in Mexico along the nearly 2,000-mile border it shares with the United States. U.S. federal, state, and local officials have stated that the prospect of crime, including violence, spilling over from Mexico into the southwestern United States is a concern. GAO was asked to review crime rates and assess information on spillover crime along the border. Specifically, this report addresses: (1) What information do reported crime rates in southwest border communities provide on spillover crime and what do they show? (2) What efforts, if any, have federal, state, and select local law enforcement agencies made to track spillover crime along the southwest border? (3) What concerns, if any, do these agencies have about spillover crime? (4) What steps, if any, have these agencies taken to address spillover crime? GAO analyzed crime data from all of the 24 southwest border counties from 2004 through 2011 and federal documentation, such as threat assessments and DHS’s plans for addressing violence along the southwest border. GAO interviewed officials from DHS and DOJ and their components. GAO also interviewed officials from 37 state and local law enforcement agencies responsible for investigating and tracking crime in the border counties in the four southwest border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas). While the results of the interviews are not generalizable, they provided insights. GAO is not making any recommendations. DHS provided comments, which highlighted border-related crime initiatives recognized by GAO. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2013. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-175: Accessed March 1, 2013 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652320.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652320.pdf Shelf Number: 127743 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeSpillover CrimeViolence Crime (U.S. and Mexico) |
Author: Aning, Kwesi Title: Drug Trafficking And Threats to National and Regional Security in West Africa Summary: In less than one and a half decades West Africa has become a major transit and repackaging hub for cocaine and heroin flowing from the Latin American and Asian producing areas to European markets. Drug trafficking is not new to the region; the phenomenon rapidly expanded in the mid-2000s as a result of a strategic shift of Latin American drug syndicates towards the rapidly growing European market, leading UNODC to state in 2008 that ‘…the crisis of drug trafficking … is gaining attention. Alarm bells are ringing …West Africa has become a hub for cocaine trafficking. This is more than a drugs problem. It is a serious security threat.” West Africa presents an ideal choice as a logistical transit center for drug traffickers: its geography makes detection difficult and facilitates transit; the region boasts well-established networks of West African smugglers and crime syndicates; and a vulnerable political environment creates opportunities for operation. In some countries, civil wars, insurgency operations, and coups have led to diminishing human capital, social infrastructure and productive national development assets. They have also generated instability, with an increase in the number of armed groups operating in the region and an increase in flows of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Instability in the Middle East has also seen flows of heavier weapons entering through the Sahel region. As in the case of Mali, drug traffickers have often availed of this instability to further their own interests. While violence on the scale of Latin American drug trafficking is yet to manifest itself, the potential for the drug trade to become a source of violent political competition in some countries nonetheless exists. More recently and as reports on drug use in the region increase, experts have highlighted the human security threats posed by drug trafficking, for which institutions and policy makers are particularly ill prepared to respond to. One of the main challenges lies in the fact that the predominant approach to drug trafficking in the region to date has been based on the international narcotics control regime which is centered on stemming the supply of drugs through law enforcement efforts. Limited focus has been placed on the health and developmental aspects of the spillover effects of drug trafficking, which over time could constitute a greater security threat to West Africa than currently acknowledged. This background paper examines the impact of drug trafficking on national and regional security in West Africa. The first sections provide an overview of the main security threats that drug trafficking is perceived to pose to states and the sub-region, including the links between drug trafficking and terrorism. Subsequently, the paper provides an overview of how the incidence of drug trafficking and perceived threats are being articulated in policy circles; and the nature of UN, AU and ECOWAS policy responses to drug trafficking and the security threats it poses. In the final section, the paper identifies knowledge gaps in the existing literature on drug trafficking in West Africa. Details: Accra, Ghana: West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2013. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: WACD Background Paper No.1: Accessed May 22, 2013 at: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Drug-Trafficking-and-Threats-to-National-and-Regional-Security-in-West-Africa-2013-04-03.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Drug-Trafficking-and-Threats-to-National-and-Regional-Security-in-West-Africa-2013-04-03.pdf Shelf Number: 128773 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (West Africa)Drug ViolenceOrganized Crime |
Author: Organization of American States Title: The Drug Problem in the Americas: Studies. Drugs and Security Summary: The relationship between the drug problem and security can be explained principally by the state’s weakness in performing its law and order functions, property protection and crime prevention. The varying capabilities of different states in the region to guarantee protection for their citizens and effective law enforcement constitute a key variable in understanding why in some countries the drug problem is viewed as a major security threat, while in others its effect is less intense. While drug use tends to be high among people who have committed crimes, this does not mean that the majority of drug users commit crimes. The relationship between drug use and the occurrence of crime tends to be highest in specific urban spaces, and is generally associated with drug use by socially marginalized groups. Drug trafficking is an important factor behind the high mortality rates of some countries in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, there is not enough evidence to conclude that recent changes in drug trafficking routes have resulted in a decline in violent deaths, suggesting that other underlying factors may be driving this violence. The relationship between the drug problem and organized crime works both ways: Illegal drugs provide resources that fuel crime, while organized crime serves as the engine to sustain much of the drug market. From a security perspective, the problem is more about organized crime than drugs. Illegal firearms trafficking is a major problem throughout the hemisphere, exacerbated by the relationship between illegal drugs and organized crime. Illegal drugs drive crime, violence, corruption, and impunity. These four factors are key to understanding the interaction among prohibition, criminal organizations, and state institutions. The drug problem accentuates corruption within countries, taking advantage of institutional weaknesses, lack of controls and regulations, and lack of judicial independence. Institutional responses to address the drug problem may trigger reactions that further aggravate levels of violence and crime. Often times, State attempts to combat criminal factions simultaneously and head-on lead to fragmentation and power vacuums that exacerbate violence. Details: Washington, DC: OAS, 2013. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 25, 2013 at: http://www.cicad.oas.org/main/policy/informeDrogas2013/drogasSeguridad_ENG.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.cicad.oas.org/main/policy/informeDrogas2013/drogasSeguridad_ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 128798 Keywords: Drug Abuse and CrimeDrug EnforcementDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceOrganized CrimePolitical Corruption |
Author: Monteiro, Joana Title: Drug Battles and School Achievement: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro's Favelas Summary: This paper examines the effects of armed conficts between drug gangs in Rio de Janeiro's favelas on student achievement. To identify the causal effect of violence on education, we explore variation in violence that occurs across time and space when gangs battle over territories. The evidence indicates that these battles are triggered by factors often exogenous to local socioeconomic conditions, such as the imprisonment or release of a gang leader, betrayals and revenge. Within-school estimates indicate that students from schools exposed to violence score less in math exams. The effect of violence increases with conflict intensity, duration, and proximity to exam dates; and decreases with the distance between the school and the conflict location. There is no evidence that the effect of violence persists for more than one year. Finally, we find that school supply is an important mechanism driving the achievement results; armed conflicts are significantly associated with higher teacher absenteeism, principal turnover, and temporary school closings. Details: Rio de Janeiro: Brazilian Institute of Economics: 2013. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper 006: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://www.ie.ufrj.br/images/pesquisa/publicacoes/2013/TD_IE_006_2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.ie.ufrj.br/images/pesquisa/publicacoes/2013/TD_IE_006_2013.pdf Shelf Number: 129191 Keywords: Drug GangsDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceEducationFavelasPovertySlums (Brazil)Socioeconomic Conditions |
Author: Ajzenman, Nicolas Title: On the Distributed Costs of Drug-Related Homicides Summary: Reliable estimates of the effects of violence on economic outcomes are scarce. We exploit the many-fold increase in homicides in 2008-2011 in Mexico resulting from its war on organized drug traffickers to estimate the effect of drug-related homicides on house prices. We use an unusually rich dataset that provides national coverage on house prices and homicides and exploit within-municipality variations. We find that the impact of violence on housing prices is borne entirely by the poor sectors of the population. An increase in homicides equivalent to one standard deviation leads to a 3% decrease in the price of low-income housing. In spite of this large burden on the poor, the willingness to pay in order to reverse the increase in drug-related crime is not high. We estimate it to be approximately 0.1% of Mexico's GDP. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2014. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 364: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/distributive-costs-drug-related-homicides_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/distributive-costs-drug-related-homicides_0.pdf Shelf Number: 132248 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceDrugs and CrimeEconomics of CrimeHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: International Displacement Monitoring Centre Title: Forced displacement linked to transnational organised crime in Mexico Summary: Drug cartel violence in Mexico has increased dramatically since 2007, when the new government of President Felipe Calderon identified insecurity as a key problem and began deploying the military to fight the cartels in key locations. According to various analysts the strategy has backfired, stirring up a hornet's nest by disturbing existing arrangements between the cartels, and sparking wars both within and between them. The impact of the violence has been enormous. Government figures put the number of people killed since the launch of the security strategy at 47,000, with more than 15,000 losing their lives in 2010 and 12,900 in the first nine months of 2011. The media have repeatedly put the death toll at 50,000, and many have referred to the violence as an insurgency or armed conflict. It is clear, however, that the cartels do not have a political agenda or ideology, and such references have prompted angry responses from the Mexican government. Whether the violence can be defined as an internal armed conflict under international humanitarian law or not, its effects on the civilian population have been significant and the response inadequate. One impact has been forced migration, both internal and cross-border. Because of available resources and timeframe this study focuses exclusively on the former. Civil society organisations, academic institutions and the media have increasingly documented cases and patterns of forced internal displacement caused by drug cartel violence. That said, aside from two cases of mass displacement - in Tamaulipas in 2010 and in Michoacan in 2011 - most people have fled individually, and as a result information is scattered. This study aims to fill that information gap. Firstly, it documents an empirical link between drug cartel violence and forced displacement at the national level, distinguishing it from economic migration and where possible identifying patterns of displacement. Secondly, it identifies and describes the vulnerabilities of those affected, focusing on access to the basic necessities of life and livelihood opportunities in places of displacement, and housing, land and property rights. Thirdly, it maps government responses at both the federal and state level. Details: Geneva, SWIT: IDMC, 2012. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2012/2012005-am-mexico-Mexico-forced-displacement-en.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2012/2012005-am-mexico-Mexico-forced-displacement-en.pdf Shelf Number: 137705 Keywords: DisappearancesDrug CartelsDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceForced MigrationHomicidesOrganized Crime |
Author: Osorio, Javier Title: Hobbes on Drugs: Understanding Drug Violence in Mexico Summary: This dissertation analyzes the unprecedented eruption of organized criminal violence in Mexico. To understand the dynamics of drug violence, this dissertation addresses three questions. What explains the onset of the war on drugs in Mexico? Once the conflict starts, why does drug violence escalate so rapidly? And lastly, why is there subnational variation in the concentration of violence? Based on a game theoretic model, the central argument indicates that democratization erodes the peaceful configurations between the state and criminal organizations and motivates authorities to fight crime, thus triggering a wave of violence between the state and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups fighting to control strategic territories. In this account, state action is not neutral: law enforcement against a criminal group generates the opportunity for a rival criminal organization to invade its territory, thus leading to violent interactions among rival criminal groups. These dynamics of violence tend to concentrate in territories favorable for the reception, production and distribution of drugs. In this way, the disrupting effect of law enforcement unleashes a massive wave of violence of all-against-all resembling a Hobbesian state of war. To test the observable implications of the theory, the empirical assessment relies on a novel database of geo-referenced daily event data at municipal level providing detailed information on who did what to whom, when and where in the Mexican war on drugs. This database covers all municipalities of the country between 2000 and 2010, thus comprising about 9.8 million observations. The creation of this fine-grained database required the development of Eventus ID, a novel software for automated coding of event data from text in Spanish. The statistical assessment relies on quasi-experimental identification strategies and time-series analysis to overcome problems of causal inference associated with analyzing the distinct - yet overlapping - processes of violence between government authorities and organized criminals and among rival criminal groups. In addition, the statistical analysis is complemented with insights from fieldwork and historical process tracing. Results provide strong support for the empirical implications derived from the theoretical model. Details: Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2013. 485p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1749033212.html?FMT=ABS Year: 2013 Country: Mexico URL: http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1749033212.html?FMT=ABS Shelf Number: 150551 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Germa-Bel Title: A two-sided coin: Disentangling the economic effects of the 'War on drugs' in Mexico Summary: Mexican President Felipe Calderon was sworn into office in December 2006. From the outset, his administration was to deploy an aggressive security policy in its fight against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), in what became known as the Mexican 'War on Drugs'. The policy was strongly condemned because of the 68,000 unintentional deaths directly attributable to it. Here, we evaluate the economic effects of this 'War on Drugs'. To disentangle the economic effects of the policy, we study the effects of homicides and the rise in the homicide rate together with the impact of federal public security grants and state-level military expenditure on economic growth. Using spatial econometrics, we find that at the state-level the number of homicides reduced the Mexican states' GDP per capita growth by 0.20 percentage points, while the growth in the homicide rate increased the states' per capita GDP by 0.81 percentage points. The government's efforts to fight DTOs had a positive and highly significant impact on economic growth. Details: Barcelona: Research Institute of Applied Economics, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper 2016/11 : Accessed February 15, 2017 at: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2016/201611.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2016/201611.pdf Shelf Number: 146289 Keywords: Drug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug WarsDrug-Related ViolenceEconomics of CrimeHomicides |
Author: Andell, Paul Title: Preventing the Violent and Sexual Victimisation of Vulnerable gang-involved and gang-affected children and young people in Ipswich Summary: A Suffolk Constabulary threat assessment initiated in 2014 observed that the supply of Class A Drugs to Ipswich and other Suffolk towns was dominated by street gangs from London. It notes that children and young people from London and Suffolk were involved in 'running' the drugs to end users and that their risk of coming to harm was high. The Police estimated at this point that a small number of young people, frequently recorded as 'missing' from Care or home by the police and Safeguarding authorities, were either known, or suspected, to be working for London-based drug dealing networks. Children and young people reported 'missing' in London had also been found at Suffolk addresses known to be used for drug dealing. The assessment recognised that in the preceding decade there had been an increase in the numbers of boys and young men travelling from London to Ipswich in order to supply Class A drugs and that members of London-based drug-dealing groups had been present in Ipswich throughout this period despite several successful police operations to disrupt the trafficking and distribution of Class A drugs. The assessment suggested that violence, threats and coercion were used routinely by these groups to exert control over vulnerable children and young people and local Class A drug users whose homes were being 'cuckooed'. This kind of violence was evident in other parts of Suffolk where the illicit drug market was saturated and competition between dealers was fierce. Intelligence also suggested that Organised Crime Groups (OCG's) involved in drug dealing were storing weapons at dealing locations and arming 'runners' with knives. In recognition of these problems, in November 2014, representatives of the government's Ending Gangs and Youth Violence (EGYV) programme were invited to undertake a peer review of the effectiveness of local responses and provide a framework for future action. The EGYV review noted that senior leaders in the County had recognized the serious threat posed by the gang problem and that a range of existing multi-agency initiatives had been put in place. It observed that the Ipswich Borough Police Commander had established a GOLD policing strategy and constructed a complementary multi-agency intervention (Operation Volcanic). However it appeared that lack of clarity vis-a-vis roles and responsibilities within the community safety and other partnerships meant there were no obvious mechanisms to effectively identify, address and communicate a way of dealing with gang offending by the partnership. It also noted that, to date, senior leaders did not have a formal or specific role and that responses were largely Police-led and enforcement-based. Details: Ipswich, UK: University of Suffolk, 2017. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 15, 2018 at: https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/27822/1/Preventing_the_violent_and_sexual_victimisation_of_vulnerable_gang_involved.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/27822/1/Preventing_the_violent_and_sexual_victimisation_of_vulnerable_gang_involved.pdf Shelf Number: 150190 Keywords: Drug DealingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceGangsSexual AssaultVictimization |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: The notorious drug trafficking kingpin Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman is now imprisoned in the United States awaiting trial, following the Mexican government's decision to extradite him to the United States on January 19, 2017, the day before President Trump took office. Guzman is charged with operating a continuing criminal enterprise and conducting drug-related crimes as the purported leader of the Mexican criminal syndicate commonly known as the Sinaloa cartel. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) maintains that the Sinaloa cartel has the widest reach into U.S. cities of any transnational criminal organization. In November 2016, in its National Drug Threat Assessment, the DEA stated that Mexican drug trafficking groups are working to expand their presence, particularly in the heroin markets inside the United States. Over the years, Mexico"s criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and increasingly the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl. Mexico's drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have been in constant flux. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Since then, the more stable large organizations have fractured. In recent years, the DEA has identified the following organizations as dominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations might be viewed as the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. New crime groups have emerged since the December 2012 inauguration of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who has faced an increasingly complex crime situation. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping for ransom, and oil syphoning, posing a governance challenge to President Pena Nieto as daunting as that faced by his predecessors. Former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. Operations to eliminate DTO leaders sparked organizational change, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. Such violence appears to be rising again in Mexico. In January 2017, the country registered more homicides than in any January since the government began to release national crime data in the late 1980s. In a single weekend in April 2017, more than 35 died in what was assumed to be drug trafficking-related violence. Although the Mexican government no longer estimates organized crime-related homicides, some independent analysts have claimed that murders linked to organized crime may have exceeded 100,000 since 2006, when President Calderon began his campaign against the DTOs. Mexico's government reported that the annual number of all homicides in Mexico declined after Calderon left office in 2012 by about 16% in 2013 and 15% in 2014, only to rise in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, the Mexican government reported a 22% increase in all homicides to 22,932, almost reaching the high point of nearly 23,000 murders in 2011, Mexico's most violent year. The 115th Congress remains concerned about security conditions inside Mexico and the illicit drug trade. The Mexican DTOs are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States and are increasingly gaining control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape has been significantly altered by fragmentation and how the organizational shape-shifting continues Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 150740 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal DrugsOrganized CrimeViolence |
Author: Beittel, June S. Title: Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations Summary: Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) pose the greatest crime threat to the United States, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA's) National Drug Threat Assessment published in October 2017. These organizations have for years been identified for their strong links to drug trafficking, money laundering, and other violent crimes. These criminal groups have trafficked heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and, increasingly, the powerful synthetic opioid fentanyl. U.S. overdoses due to opioid consumption sharply increased to a record level in 2016, following the Mexican criminal syndicates expanded control of the heroin and synthetic opioids market. The major DTOs and new crime groups have furthered their expansion into such illicit activity as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft that costs the government's oil company more than a billion dollars a year. Mexico's DTOs have also been in constant flux. Early in his term, former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006-2012) initiated an aggressive campaign against Mexico's drug traffickers that was a defining policy of his government and one that the DTOs violently resisted. By some accounts, in 2006, there were four dominant DTOs: the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organization (AFO), the Sinaloa cartel, the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organization (CFO), and the Gulf cartel. Government operations to eliminate DTO leadership sparked organizational changes, which led to significant instability among the groups and continued violence. In recent years, larger and more stable organizations have fractured, leaving the DEA and other analysts to identify seven organizations as predominant: Sinaloa, Los Zetas, Tijuana/AFO, Juarez/CFO, Beltran Leyva, Gulf, and La Familia Michoacana. In some sense, these organizations include the "traditional" DTOs, although the 7 organizations appear to have fragmented further to at least 9 (or as many as 20) major organizations. A new transnational criminal organization, Cartel Jalisco-New Generation, which split from Sinaloa in 2010, has sought to become dominant with brutally violent techniques. During the term of President Enrique Peea Nieto that will end in 2018, the government has faced an increasingly complex crime situation that saw violence spike. In 2017, Mexico reached its highest number of total intentional homicides in a year, exceeding, by some counts, 29,000 murders. In the 2017-2018 election period that opened in September 2017 and ran through June 12, 2018, 114 candidates and politicians were killed allegedly by crime bosses and others in an effort to intimidate public office holders, according to a security consultancy that tracks these homicides. On July 1, 2018, Andres Manuel Lopez Obredor won the election for President by as much as 30 points over the next contender. He leads a new party, Morena, but has served as Mayor of Mexico City and comes from a leftist ideological viewpoint. Lopez Obredor campaigned on fighting corruption and finding new ways to combat crime and manage the illicit drug trade. U.S. foreign assistance for Mexico in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) totaled $152.6 million, with more than $100 million of that funding focused on rule of law and counternarcotics efforts. The 115th Congress pursued oversight of security conditions inside of Mexico and monitored the Mexican criminal organizations not only because they are the major wholesalers of illegal drugs in the United States but also to appraise their growing control of U.S. retail-level distribution. This report examines how the organized crime landscape in Mexico has been altered by fragmentation of criminal groups and how the organizational shape-shifting continues. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R41576: Accessed )ctober 22, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Mexico URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf Shelf Number: 153043 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceDrug-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal DrugsOrganized CrimeViolence |